What has been the historical relationship between set theory and logic? On the one hand, Zermelo and other mathematicians developed set theory as a Hilbert-style axiomatic system. On the other hand, set theory influenced logic by suggesting to Schröder, Löwenheim and others the use of infinitely long expressions. The questions of which logic was appropriate for set theory - first-order logic, second-order logic, or an infinitary logic - culminated in a vigorous exchange between Zermelo and Gödel around 1930.

Hilbert’s unpublished 1917 lectures on logic, analyzed here, are the beginning of modern metalogic. In them he proved the consistency and Post-completeness (maximal consistency) of propositional logic -results traditionally credited to Bernays (1918) and Post (1921). These lectures contain the first formal treatment of first-order logic and form the core of Hilbert’s famous 1928 book with Ackermann. What Bernays, influenced by those lectures, did in 1918 was to change the emphasis from the consistency and Post-completeness of a logic to its (...) soundness and completeness: a sentence is provable if and only if valid. By 1917, strongly influenced by PM, Hilbert accepted the theory of types and logicism -a surprising shift. But by 1922 he abandoned the axiom of reducibility and then drew back from logicism, returning to his 1905 approach of trying to prove the consistency of number theory syntactically. (shrink)

What gave rise to Ernst Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory in 1908? According to the usual interpretation, Zermelo was motivated by the set-theoretic paradoxes. This paper argues that Zermelo was primarily motivated, not by the paradoxes, but by the controversy surrounding his 1904 proof that every set can be wellordered, and especially by a desire to preserve his Axiom of Choice from its numerous critics. Here Zermelo's concern for the foundations of mathematics diverged from Bertrand Russell's on the one hand (...) and from Felix Hausdorff's on the other. (shrink)

This paper explores how the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) arose from Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis in the work of Peirce, Jourdain, Hausdorff, Tarski, and how GCH was used up to Gödel's relative consistency result.

This paper combines personal reminiscences of the philosopher John Corcoran with a discussion of certain conflicts between historians of logic and philosophers of logic. Some mistaken claims about the history of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem are analyzed in detail and corrected.

This volume shows Russell in transition from a neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosopher to an analytic philosopher of the first rank. During this period his research centred on writing The Principles of Mathematics where he drew together previously unpublished drafts. These shed light on Russell's paradox. This material will alter previous accounts of how he discovered his paradox and the related paradox of the largest cardinal. The volume also includes a previously unpublished draft of an early attempt to solve his paradox, (...) as well as the earliest known version of his generalised relation arithmetic. It contains three articles which have never previously been published in English. (shrink)

This volume of Bertrand Russell's _Collected Papers_ finds Russell focused on writing _Principia Mathematica_ during 1905–08. Eight previously unpublished papers shed light on his different versions of a substitutional theory of logic, with its elimination of classes and relations, during 1905-06. A recurring issue for him was whether a type hierarchy had to be part of a substitutional theory. In mid-1907 he began writing up the final version of _Principia_, now using a ramified theory of types, and eleven unpublished drafts (...) from 1907-08 deal with this. Numerous letters show his thoughts on the process. The volume's 80-page introduction covers the evolution of his logic from 1896 until 1909, when volume I of _Principia _went to the printer. (shrink)